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Abstract
The announcement of an extension of quantitative easing (QE) until March 2017,
at least, has cast doubts on the strength of the Euro area recovery and it has
raised concerns about the credibility of the ECB. In this contribution, we argue
that the current design of QE prevents unlimited monetary accommodation and,
meanwhile, it may reduce the effectiveness of QE. Extending QE again through a
modification in its design is thus possible. It will be effective provided
governments and the ECB are able to cooperate.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 Considering the extension of the quantitative easing (QE) programme announced on
December 3rd, 2015, the ECB would hold 11% of the stock of debt issued by central
and other government tiers of Eurozone countries in March 2017. The proportion of
debt held by the ECB would remain relatively limited in comparison with public debt
holdings by other central banks. The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the
Bank of Japan hold respectively 13.5%, 22.5% and 27.1% of public debt issued by
their respective governments.
 The criteria set by the ECB regarding its ability to purchase securities in the
secondary market may limit the scope for increasing the size of the Public Sector
Purchase Programme (PSPP). Yet, under its current design, the ECB’s purchase of
public securities would amount to €520bn in 2016, representing 38% of total
financing needs of Euro area governments.
 To amplify the monetary stimulus, the ECB should decide to remove the 25%
purchasing limit, should remove the deposit floor constraint on purchases, should
target new types of securities (i.e. corporate debts or sovereign derivatives) and
should deviate from the capital shares, hence increasing risk-sharing of the
programme.
 Insolvency and inflation risks should not be overestimated. Today’s risk for ECB’s
credibility is not to increase inflation but to be unable to avoid below-target inflation
and deflation.
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"If at first you don't succeed, Mr. Kidd", "Try, try again, Mr. Wint."
Diamonds are forever, directed by G. Hamilton
1. INTRODUCTION
In January 2015, the ECB announced a substantial increase in its asset purchase
programmes. Until then, the ECB had been buying asset-backed securities (ABS) and
covered bonds (CB) for an approximate amount of €10bn per month. Following the January
2015 announcement, the total assets purchases has risen to €60bn per month. The
additional purchase of €50bn of assets per month is made through the Public Sector
Purchase Programme (PSPP). This programme consists of €6bn of debt securities of EU
supranational institutions and €44bn of debt securities of sovereign, national agencies and
national utilities. The programme started in March 2015 and was initially supposed to last
at least until September 2016.
Following the Governing Council of the 3rd December 2015, the President of the ECB
announced the decision to extend the length of the programme until March 2017 at least.
The monthly amounts stand still but eligible assets have been extended to regional and
local governments’ bonds. Besides, the ECB also announced a reduction in the deposit
facility rate, which stands now at -0.3%.
It is interesting to note that this extension has been either perceived as a disappointment,
because it was of a limited size, or as a threat to the ECB’s credibility, because it produced
a growing size of its balance sheet, some quasi-fiscal policies and a possible risk of
insolvency.
In the following, we first discuss the size of QE and highlight the constraints that the ECB
has imposed itself to limit its QE policies. These constraints, as they stand, up to now, limit
its margins for maneuver and should help refraining fears of unlimited monetary
accommodation.
Second, having said that does not preclude from discussing the possible risks of the QE
extension. If the risk of inflation and the risk of insolvency are non-negligible risks, this is
certainly because they both relate to a possible lack of coordination between ECB monetary
policy and fiscal policies. We will argue that though important, this risk remains low in the
European context.
Another kind of risk finally relates to the timing of the announcement. The precocity of the
extension announcement, which is maybe intended to counter-balance the delay in
announcing the QE programme, leaves open the question of future margins for maneuver
for the ECB. What would they be and would the overall design of the new programme have
to change? The question of the extension of eligible assets would be posed as would be the
possible increase in the monthly assets’ purchases. The question of QE effectiveness is thus
central in this respect. We briefly review the options.
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2. EXTENDING QE: HOW AND HOW MUCH?
The extension in the duration of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) to March 2017 with
the monthly purchase rate maintained at €60bn consists in a €360bn increase in the size of
the APP. The Governing Council maintained its language that the programme would
continue until a sustained adjustment in inflation, suggesting that a further extension
beyond March 2017 would be possible if inflation remained low. The ECB also announced
the reinvestment of principal payments, so when bonds mature the ECB will reinvest the
principal.
Under the PSPP, national securities are purchased in proportion to the Eurozone's national
central banks' shareholdings of the ECB (in effect, in proportion to the size of national
economies). With the extended PSPP, the size of the ECB’s balance sheet will increase and
may rapidly resume the peak above €3,000bn observed in August 20121 (see figure 1). At
the time of announcement, the total assets held by the ECB amounted to €2,200bn. The
total assets to be purchased in this window are now supposed to reach €1.5 trillion. In
March 2017, the ECB would hold 11% of the stock of debt issued by central and other
government tiers of Eurozone countries.
Figure 1: ECB’s balance sheet (assets), € Billions
Source: ECB.
As a matter of fact, the ECB provides information on the breakdown of purchases realized
since March 2015. Under a stable allocation of debt instruments’ purchases by the ECB, we
can infer the proportion of European debts held by the ECB by March 2017 (table 1).2 In
December 2015, total purchases of sovereign assets issued by Euro area governments
1 At the time of the first announcement on the PSPP in January 2015, the total assets held by the ECB amounted
to €2,200 billion and the President of the ECB Mario Draghi explicitly formulated at several occasions in 2014 the
objective of increasing the size of the balance sheet.
2 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html.
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amounted to €434.8bn, hence 4.5% of total gross public debt. Taking into account the
SMP, the ECB is holding 5.7% of gross public debt issued by Euro area governments.
Consequently, the ECB has become a significant actor in the market for public debt in the
Euro area. It will become a more significant one after the QE extension. Considering a
stable breakdown of purchases computed as the monthly average of purchases in 2015, we
can compute the expected amount and allocation of debt securities that could be held by
the ECB in March 2017.3 Overall, the ECB holdings of debt securities would represent
11.1% of total gross public debt of the Euro area4. The ECB would hold, for example, 9% of
Italian debt, 11% of French debt, 13% of German and Spanish debt, 15% of Finnish debt
and 28% of Slovakian debt.
Table 1: Gross public debt and ECB holdings of sovereign
Gross public
debt (2015)
Billion,
national
currency
Central bank
holdings
(31.12.2015),
Billions
national
currency*
Central banks
holdings
(31.12.2015)
as % of gross
public debt*
Central banks
holdings
(PSPP+SMP)
(31.12.2015)
as % of gross
public debt
Planned ECB
holdings
(31.03.2017),
Billion euro *
Planned ECB
holdings
(31.12.2017)
as % of gross
public debt*
Belgium 437.7 15.9 (3.7) 3.6 3.6 39.7 9.1
Germany 2156.8 115.6 (26.6) 5.4 5.4 289.1 13.4
Estonia 2.1 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ireland 203.7 7.6 (1.7) 3.7 7.6 19.0 9.3
Greece 337.3 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0
Spain 1087.3 56.8 (13.1) 5.2 7.5 142.0 13.1
France 2098.9 91.8 (21.1) 4.4 4.4 229.4 10.9
Italy 2174.4 79.2 (18.2) 3.6 6.5 198.0 9.1
Cyprus 18.5 0.3 (0.1) 1.5 1.5 0.7 3.8
Latvia 9.4 0.7 0.2) 7.3 7.3 1.7 18.2
Lithuania 15.8 1.1 (0.3) 7.0 7.0 2.8 17.5
Luxembourg 11.2 1.1 (0.3) 9.9 9.9 2.8 24.8
Malta 5.6 0.3 (0.1) 5.1 5.1 0.7 12.6
Netherlands 467.9 25.6 (5.9) 5.5 5.5 64.0 13.7
Austria 291.2 12.6 (2.9) 4.3 4.3 31.6 10.9
Portugal 229.0 11.2 (2.6) 4.9 10.2 28.1 12.3
Slovenia 32.4 2.2 (0.5) 6.9 6.9 5.6 17.2
Slovakia 41.2 4.6 (1.1) 11.2 11.2 11.6 28.0
Finland 130.3 8.1 (1.9) 6.2 6.2 20.2 15.5
Euro area 9758.4 434.8 (100.0) 4.5 5.7 1086.9 11.1
Supranationals 60.1 150.26
U. Kingdom 1664.8 375.0 22.5
United-States 18189.0 2462.0 13.5
Japan 1197146 325001.9 27.1
*: PSPP only for the ECB. % of total sovereign purchases in brackets.
Sources: ECB, European Commission, OFCE.
The proportion of debt held by the ECB, though on an upward trend, remains relatively
limited in comparison with public debt holdings by other central banks in the world like the
Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan. Indeed, the ECB would hold a
smaller share (11.1 %) of total debt in 2017 than the US Fed at the end of 2015, with its
3 Without taking into account the residual amount held from the SMP.
4 In December 2015, the ECB has decided to include in the PSPP euro-denominated marketable debt issued by
regional and local governments located in the euro area. This decision would yet leave unchanged the estimate
above since regional and local governments debt is consolidated with central government debt.
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holdings of 13.5% of US public debt. The £375bn held by the Bank of England through its
QE programmes5 represented 22.5% of total debt issued by the British government. By the
end of 2015, the Bank of Japan was holding more than a quarter of Japanese total public
debt.
The purchases of debt instruments by the ECB have also appeared limited as far as
financial market expectations are concerned. Actually, before QE extension, financial
market operators had expected an increase in debt purchases of €650bn.
An important question about QE has been its incidence on risk and allocation of it. The ECB
indicated that the credit risk of the €6bn debt of the supranational EU institutions and €4bn
of the national debt securities would be shared across the Eurosystem according to
shareholdings. The credit risk of the remaining €40bn of national securities would remain
with the national central bank of the issuer. In practice, sovereign debt purchases with
national risk sharing are limited by the loss absorption capacities of the national central
banks.
It is noteworthy that PSPP risk-sharing is lower than that involved by the Securities Market
Programme (SMP) in 2010-2012 with its acquisition of €220bn public and private debt
securities from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain to be held to maturity. Within the
SMP, profits and losses are shared across national central banks according to the ECB’s
shareholdings rather than borne by the national central bank of the issuing government.
The PSPP also differs substantially from the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
instrument, as announced in September 2012. OMT enables the ECB to purchase the debts
of distressed Eurozone sovereign states as a stabilizing mechanism. In this case, the ECB
has stated its intention to hold purchased bonds on its own balance sheet, effectively
sharing the associated risks among all Eurozone member states.
The current design of the PSPP limits the scope for increasing its size. The ECB has indeed
fixed rules limiting the amount of securities that can be purchased in the secondary market.
First, bonds must have a remaining maturity between 2 and 30 years. Then, the ECB
cannot buy assets for which the yield is below the deposit rate. The proportion of
German/French bonds yielding below the deposit rate (and hence ineligible) (see figures 2a
and 2b) is a key consideration in explaining why the ECB decided to cut further the deposit
rate in December 2015, from -0.2 to -0.3%. It has lifted a bit the limit and therefore
permitted the ECB to keep on buying “safe” German and French public debts. Second,
under the current programme, government bonds are purchased in proportion to the ECB’s
capital shares. The ECB can buy up to 33% of a country’s outstanding stock of eligible
bonds (the limit is 25% for bonds with collective action clauses, CACs, to ensure that the
ECB will never hold a blocking minority). Since government debt is not distributed
uniformly across the Euro area, the purchase limit is self-limiting as it can bind on different
countries at different times. The smallest countries are already close to the limits and will
have insufficient domestic debt to fulfill their quotas. The programme therefore allows for
affected central banks to purchase supranational bonds. However, because supranational
purchases account for 12% of the overall stock of purchases, reallocation of debt purchases
towards supranational bonds will not always be possible, e.g. if the domestic debt limit is
hit in a large country.
Actually, based on projections of countries’ borrowing requirements, small countries are
approaching the debt limits suggesting that the ECB will have to switch to supranational
debt purchases. Germany may hit the limit shortly after September 2016, with Portugal
and Finland not far behind, or Latvia, Luxembourg and Estonia, as emphasized by Clays,
5 The QE in the UK started in March 2009 after the BoE announced £200bn purchases of Gilts. The programme has
come to a halt until October 2011 and resumed (it was then called QEII) to reach £375bn in November 2012.
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Leandro and Mandra (2015). In Portugal, the limit is notably reached because of the SMP
programme. That suggests only little scope for extending the programme under its current
design.
Figure 2a. Sovereign yields in Germany at different maturities (in %)
Sources: Datastream, ECB
Figure 2b. Sovereign yields in France at different maturities (in %)
Sources: Datastream, ECB
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3. EXTENDING QE: WHAT RISKS?
With QE, ECB has engaged in a new way of conducting monetary policy.6 Before the
financial crisis, the conduct of monetary policy boiled down to fixing the policy rate and
providing liquidity – through main refinancing operations (MRO) and long-term refinancing
operation (LTRO) – in order to bring the short-term market rates close to the target fixed
by the central bank. Liquidity was provided against collateral limiting the risk of central
bank operations.7
With the financial crisis, central banks have entered a new era where criteria for collateral
have been modified, where the size and composition of the balance sheet’s assets have
been significantly altered. The ECB holds covered bonds, asset-backed securities and
sovereign bonds. The central banks actions now entail risks. Thus, there is a possibility that
asset purchased by the ECB (either through the PPSP, or ABSP or CBPP) programmes
become worth much less, either because people later worry more about default, or because
one government actually defaults, or exits the Euro area. ECB may then suffer from capital
losses. The issue then arises of a potential need to recapitalize the ECB or national central
banks, and eventually of central bank’s insolvency. Another issue relates to so-called on-
going “quasi-fiscal” policies by the ECB and their impact on inflation.
3.1 Insolvency risk
Can central banks go bankrupt? It might be considered that this risk is limited as they issue
a specific liability: central banks’ reserves, held by the financial sector. Central banks issue
base money (reserves held by banks and paper money), which may be considered as a
non-interest bearing liability.8 Following this argument, central banks would always be
solvent. There are yet limits to the issuance of base money and even if central banks are
not under the same regulations as commercial banks, troubles may arise. They have
already occurred in the past, as reminded by Stella and Lönnberg (2008).
Intertemporal insolvency is the most relevant concept to assess the financial position of
central banks (see Reis, 2013, 2015, and the appendix). It explicitly takes into account as a
liability the present discounted value of expenditures (the future costs of running central
banks – administrative costs – and future payments to the Treasury) and the present
discounted value of revenues: seigniorage profits (interest saved on the current and future
stocks of non-interest bearing liabilities9). Insolvency occurs when seigniorage revenues do
not cover present discounted expenditures. This approach accounts for the possibility of
central banks to increase assets to a very large value and finance these asset purchases by
issuing reserves. It is clearly the argument according to which central banks would never
fail. Yet, considering that functioning costs are negligible and for given expected payment
to the Treasury, central banks’ solvency boils down to the ability for central banks to raise
seigniorage revenues.
May revenues from seigniorage become infinite? The answer is no. If central banks issue
reserves to finance assets purchases, the banking sector may seek to exchange excess
reserves for banknotes. Therefore, real revenues from seigniorage are limited by the
demand for money and eventually eroded by inflation. Then, there would be a need to
6 It was actually already the case with CBPP, SMP or even with other unconventional monetary policy measures.
Yet, the size of PSPP makes this change more significant.
7 Monetary policy operations in the United States did not consist in direct lending to the banking system but in
Treasuries purchases. Yet, the Fed only purchased short maturity assets limiting the risk of its portfolio.
8 Actually, most central banks (including the ECB) have decided to remunerate reserves. Yet, this interest rate is
lower than interest rate earnings on assets held by central banks.
9 The central bank issues reserves and may acquire assets in counterparty. Revenues are then the interest paid on
those assets financed by issued reserves.
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recapitalize the central bank. It is generally supposed that seigniorage revenues are hump-
shaped so that they decrease beyond a threshold level.
According to several authors central banks are inherently linked to governments so that
central banks’ finance is not an issue (central banks finance has to be consolidated with
government finance). Treasury always provides a financial backup to central banks and
central banks cannot be insolvent separately from governments. According to Buiter
(2006), “the concept of a financially independent central bank is therefore, in substance,
vacuous, whatever the formal legal status of the central bank… First the inflation target has
to be financeable by the state, that is, the consolidated central bank and government.
Second, when monetary policy is institutionally delegated to central bank, the Treasury has
to stand behind the central bank”.
Yet, for the ECB, no central government stands behind the ECB but national central banks.
It may be argued that it makes no difference if NCB’s are backed by national governments
and the ECB is backed by NCB’s. However, as emphasized by Stella and Lönnberg (2008)
governments do not always stand behind central banks. First, they may sometimes be
reluctant to meet their commitments. Besides, in some countries, independence issue is so
strong that it is explicitly stated (by law) that “the central bank is not responsible for the
liabilities of the state and the state is not responsible for the liabilities of the central bank”.
It is notably the case for the Baltic states. Yet, for most Euro area countries, governments
would certainly stand behind national central banks. However, they may not be able to
recapitalize them. ECB and national central banks are indeed exposed to sovereign risk. It
is doubtful though that governments would be able to recapitalize any central bank
suffering from capital losses on Treasury securities. Then, central banks’ insolvency is
either inherently linked to government insolvency or to inflation risk.
3.2 Inflation risk
QE operations are sometimes referred to as “quasi-fiscal” operations as they do not
conform to traditional monetary policy (Park, 2015). According to Goodfriend (2011),
“quasi-fiscal operations” are operations putting taxpayers at risk; hence they are equivalent
to fiscal decisions. This argument can be related to the Fiscal theory of the price level
(FTPL) (Sims, 1994; Woodford, 1994) which draws extensively on the interactions of fiscal
and monetary policies at the equilibrium (Leeper, 1991). Del Negro and Sims (2015) have
recently discussed, in this framework, about the Fed’s QE policies and concluded that fiscal
backing by the Fed did not pose any issues of Fed’s solvency except under extreme
conditions, namely hyper-inflations.
The FTPL discusses about the fiscal requirements for achieving a stable economic system,
according to the nature of monetary policy. In case the latter is aggressive at taming
inflation, fiscal policy ought to target a stable debt-to-GDP ratio unless the economy is
unstable. Otherwise, fiscal policy can be relieved from the objective of fiscal sustainability
because monetary policy leaves the consumer price jump so that the real value of debt
stabilizes in proportion to GDP. The FTPL works like a Quantity theory of Public Debt: in
contrast with the Quantity theory of money according to which higher money creation leads
to higher prices, the FTPL states that higher nominal debt eventually leads to higher prices
when the central bank is “ passive”.
The current QE programme by the ECB nicely fits into this framework. The purchases of
debt instruments ease the financing conditions of governments (bond prices are going up
and yields are going down) and as a counterpart, the ECB is increasing high-powered
money. This may lead banks to increase reserves or lead to higher money creation, then
inflation. Does it mean a higher risk? No, in theory, as the price jump occurs at equilibrium.
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Stated differently, nominal values are growing, but real values remain constant. The QE
experiment is thus embedded in a general equilibrium framework, i.e. a stable framework.
What about the inflation risk in practice? As a matter of fact, if inflation increases above
ECB’s target, ECB’s credibility will be undermined. Yet, QE and the decision to extend it
beyond September 2016 have precisely aimed at reshaping inflation’s expectations in order
to finally meet the 2% inflation target in the medium term. Therefore, today’s risk for ECB’s
credibility is not to increase inflation but to be unable to avoid deflation.
QE programmes carry some risks of insolvency or inflation. A prerequisite to a stable
equilibrium is cooperative behaviors by governments and the central bank. Yet, those risks
are currently rather limited, with governments aiming at limiting their debt-to-GDP ratios,
whereas deflation risk remains pervasive. Being passive and still resorting to standard
central banking would be far riskier as the Euro area’s prolonged depression would fuel
deflation, hence posing a threat to central bank credibility.
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4. EXTENDING QE AGAIN: IS IT POSSIBLE?
Given the limited increase in the size of the APP, the reason for the extension of December
2015 has remained unclear. The ECB could have announced the extension of the APP later;
it could have completed it with a size extension in December 2015 without extending it to
new asset types. The ECB has sent two signals. The first one relates to the availability of
debt instruments. Due to the internal limits, there may have been risks of scarcity on the
Treasuries’ markets. Extending QE to new assets like regional debt instrument is a good
way to circumvent the possible scarcity of debt instruments. Keeping in mind that Germany
and Spain have large and liquid regional debt markets, QE extension has been targeted to
cope with and resolve scarcity. Second, QE extension can be interpreted as a type of
“forward-guidance”. With the announcement of continuing asset purchases until March
2017, the ECB has signaled its will to maintain short-run interest rate at their current (low)
level until then. This reflects the perceived risk of continuing below-target inflation by the
ECB. Does this mean that QE could be extended in size and/or to new assets?
As we have argued, there is only limited room for scaling up the QE programme under its
current design. Increasing its size or its allocation would thus require some modifications in
its design.
First, the ECB could decide to remove purchasing limit (the 33% limit for bonds without
CACs). This would generate a long-lasting and sharp influence on debt liquidity and may
improve the effectiveness of QE. As a matter of fact, an important transmission channel of
QE is the portfolio balance effect.10 The central bank’s purchases push prices of sovereign
assets up and lead investors to seek for close substitutes. In the end, sovereign yields
decrease and corporate yields as well. Investors can also switch to foreign (non-European)
sovereign assets leading to currency depreciation. Consequently, the effectiveness of the
portfolio balance effect is high if the central bank alters significantly the market liquidity of
public debt by buying large amounts of sovereign assets.
Actually, in 2015 the total purchases of government public debt securities (excluding
supranational purchases) by the ECB have been €434.8bn whereas estimates of financing
needs have amounted to €1,400bn. It must be reminded that securities are not purchased
on the primary market but on the secondary market. Yet comparing assets purchases with
yearly issuance of securities provides information on the liquidity impact of ECB decisions
and then on its ability to influence sovereign assets’ prices. In the case of Slovakia (see
table 2), the ECB purchases amounted to €5.2bn in 2015 approaching 90% of the
Slovakian financing needs. If the ECB had realized its operations on the primary market, it
would have acquired nearly all assets issued during the year. 10% would have been left to
other investors forcing them to switch to other assets. With €115.6bn purchases of German
bonds, the ECB has absorbed the equivalent of 66% of financing needs. Supposing that
ECB monthly purchases for 2016 are of the same amount as in 2015, the ECB would then
buy 79% of the German financing needs. To compare with the implementation of the QE I
and QE II of the Bank of England, purchases realized in 2009 (respectively in 2012) have
represented 97.2 % (respectively 76 %) of Gilt issuances.
10 See Blot, Creel, Hubert and Labondance (2015).
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Table 2. Public financing needs and ECB yearly purchases of public debt securities
Total financing needs in (€ bn) ECB PSPP purchases (€ bn) ECB PSPP purchases (in % of
financing needs)
2015 2016 2015 2016 2015 2016
Belgium 80.8 76.3 15.9 19.1 19.7 25.0
Germany 175.2 175.2 115.6 138.8 66.0 79.2
Estonia na na 0.0 0.0 na Na
Ireland 20.8 16.7 7.6 9.1 36.4 54.4
Greece na na 0.0 0.0 na Na
Spain 231.9 236.2 56.8 68.2 24.5 28.9
France 376.3 395.9 91.8 110.1 24.4 27.8
Italy 349.9 323.7 79.2 95.1 22.6 29.4
Cyprus na na 0.3 0.3 na Na
Latvia na na 0.7 0.8 na Na
Lithuania 3.1 2.8 1.1 1.3 35.8 48.1
Luxembourg na na 1.1 1.3 na Na
Malta 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.3 52.9 50.0
Netherlands 73.7 56.6 25.6 30.7 34.8 54.3
Austria 25.2 24.9 12.6 15.2 50.1 61.0
Portugal 35.9 31.3 11.2 13.5 31.3 43.1
Slovenia 3.5 5.5 2.2 2.7 63.0 49.0
Slovakia 5.2 6.8 4.6 5.5 89.6 81.6
Finland 16.9 17.5 8.1 9.7 47.9 55.4
Sources: ECB, IMF (Fiscal monitor, April 2015)
Note: Financing needs are calculated as the sum of new debt resulting from budget deficit and debt arriving to
maturity.
Second, the ECB could remove the deposit floor constraint on purchases. This would permit
to purchase all “safe” debts (with a negative yield). A glance at figures 2a and 2b shows
that the loss incurred by the ECB (the yield on some assets could fall below the yield on
some liabilities) would be small.
Third, the ECB could target new types of securities, i.e. corporate debts or sovereign
derivatives. While the current spot curve means that German Bunds with residual maturity
of less than 3½ years are yielding below the deposit rate, and so are ineligible, the forward
curve shows that all Bunds with maturities more than 2 years are eligible (with yields above
-0.3%) by the end of 2016. So the proportion of total debt that is eligible for purchase
could be increasing over time and constraints on the total size of the APP would be less
tight for extensions beyond September 2016.
Fourth, the ECB could deviate from the capital shares, hence increasing risk-sharing of the
programme. Politically speaking, it would certainly be very difficult to implement.
Economically speaking, it questions the link between risk-sharing and overall risk and/or
effectiveness of PSPP. The fact that Mario Draghi made clear that: “risk-sharing is
fundamental for the effectiveness” of OMT, suggests that the limited risk-sharing of QE
impinges on its effectiveness. It is noteworthy that in the US, QE purchases are being held
in the System Open Market Account (SOMA) where possible losses are shared across the
Federal Reserve System.
Three arguments can be put forward to conclude that increasing risk-sharing will increase
risk or decrease effectiveness. First, coupon payments are kept within national borders.
Hence, because fiscal policy remains country-specific, national authorities should bear the
credit risk. If credit risk is shared across Euro area countries, governments may be less
Rooms for extension of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme
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motivated to balance their budget and sustainability issues will arise. Uncooperative
behaviors between governments and the ECB would destabilize the Euro area economy and
fuel inflation risk. Second, national central banks have the fiscal support of their respective
governments, not the ECB. Third, risk-sharing is useless and has no effect on the
effectiveness of QE since it has no effect on the creation of high-powered money.
However, greater risk-sharing also has some advantages. First, the Banking Union is
supposed to disrupt the link between governments and national banking sectors. Requiring
national central banks to purchase large amounts of their government debt would
regenerate that link. Second, if a government’s solvency is at risk, the limited risk-sharing
may increase the cost of funding relative to a QE programme with more risk-sharing.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
To sum up, a new extension of QE is possible, though certainly limited, either by the
current design of the assets purchasing programme, by the future financing needs of Euro
area governments, or by a political reluctance to see the ECB bear more risk. This
reluctance questions the future of policymaking. Is unconventional monetary policy a
temporary tool or is it the “new normal”? If the latter case applies and monetary policy
becomes less endorsed with price stability than with the management of risk premia, QE
extension will be very likely.
In central bankers communication there is a question of balance of risk as far as QE
measures are concerned. In the short-term, the main economic risk remains deflation, so
that the actions taken so far contribute to mitigate this risk; they shall not be overly
criticized for creating illusory risks of central bank insolvency or an inflation risk. The
monetary policy in the Euro area has contributed to the on-going, though weak, recovery.
Yet, the tools at the disposal of the central bank may lead to higher inflation and higher
risks – either for central bank’s solvency or for the economy if not tuned appropriately with
business and financial cycles.
Rooms for extension of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme
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APPENDIX
From a theoretical perspective, Reis (2013, 2015) disentangles 3 types of insolvency:
- “period insolvency” when the value of assets becomes inferior to the value of
liabilities. The current net worth of the central bank is negative and it is unable to
pay dividend to the government because of capital losses.
- “rule insolvency”, does arise when the central bank is not able to meet its
commitments (the rule of dividend as defined in its charter). “This may be
equivalent to period insolvency if the rule implies that dividends can never be
negative” (Reis, 2015).
- “intertemporal insolvency”. Here, future commitment and revenues are taken in to
account to assess the situation of central banks. Such an approach takes explicitly
into account the intertemporal budget constraint and central banks become
insolvent when present discounted revenue are lower than present discounted
expenditures.
To provide better insight into the distinction made above, it is useful to recall that on the
asset side, central banks hold different types of assets: official foreign exchange reserves,
credit to the financial sector, Treasury securities and other securities since the financial
crisis. Before the financial crisis, 40% of ECB assets was lending to Euro area credit
institutions through MRO and LTRO. This share has now fallen under 20% whereas
securities issued by Euro area residents have jumped from 6.7% in 2006 to 43% in January
2016 (30.3 for securities held for monetary purpose only).11
For central banks, the main source of default is related to losses on foreign exchange
reserves or capital losses on risky assets. On the liability side, central banks issue a non-
interest bearing liability (also called high-powered money), which is the sum of reserves
held by the credit institutions and banknotes in circulation.
According to the distinction above, the central bank would be insolvent if losses on
exchange rate reserves or capital losses are such that the value of assets becomes inferior
to the value of liabilities. Net worth becomes negative and the central bank cannot pay
dividend. It should be recapitalized. Yet, for some central banks rules allow central banks to
create “revaluation account”. Then losses become an asset and can be viewed as a claim on
government. By this accounting operation, current losses may be compensated by future
profits. Stella and Lönnberg (2008) remind that central banks are indeed not requested to
meet the same legal obligations as commercial banks. Realized profits may be retained and
not distributed to owners. Then “period insolvency” may not be relevant. Nor would be
“rule insolvency” if, by accounting operations, the central has the ability to postpone its
commitments regarding the payment of dividend.
11 For the US, more than 85% of the Federal Reserve Bank’s assets were Treasury securities. At the beginning of
2006, the Fed did hold neither bank loans nor agency securities. Banks loans represented more than 20% of the
Fed’s assets in 2008Q3. This share has gone back to zero by the end of 2015 and Agency and GSE-backed
securities now represent nearly 40% of the balance sheet.
